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For Every Law, a Loophole: Flexibility in the Menu of
Spanish Business Forms, 1886-1936
Timothy W. Guinnane and Susana Martίnez Rodrίguez

Abstract
The Spanish business code allowed firms great flexibility in their organizational form in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Until 1920, firms had the same basic
choices as in France and some other European countries, namely, the corporation, the
ordinary partnership, or the limited partnership. But Spanish law was unusually flexible,
allowing firms to adapt the corporation especially to the needs of its owners. Starting in
1920 Spanish firms could also organize as a Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada
(SRL), a form similar to the German GmbH or the British Private Limited Company
(PLC). But some firms had already adopted the form prior to 1920. The Spanish coded
lacked the principle of “numerus clauses” that is central to many areas of law. Most
business codes allow firms to choose only from a proscribed menu of options. The
Spanish code offered these options but also stated that firms could organize in other ways
if they wished. This paper uses three empirical sources to study the way firms actually
used those possibilities. We find that this flexibility did not make entrepreneurs
indifferent across the different organizational forms.

JEL codes: K20, N43, N44
Keywords: Spanish economic history, legal form of enterprise, law and finance

Spain was one of the poorest and least developed countries in western Europe as late as the
1950s. Several sets of reasons have been advanced for this relative poverty. This paper examines a
specific version of the view that Spanish institutions constrained economic growth. We study the
relationship between company law and the organization of multi-owner firms, first by tracing the
evolution of organizational law in Spain from 1886 to 1936, and then by using three different
empirical sources to study the way the different organizational forms were used by Spanish business.
Our study spans a period that includes the considerable repatriation of capital from the (former)
Spanish empire, as well as the introduction of a new legal form for business, the private limitedliability company. We end our study in 1936 because of the Spanish Civil War.
We are interested in two questions. First, Spain was undoubtedly a civil-law country, with
heavy borrowing from French law throughout the nineteenth century. Yet, unlike most civil-law
countries, the Spanish business code was very flexible. How did this flexibility affect the choice of
organizational form? Second, the private company introduced in the 1920s (Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada or SRL), in some ways did little more than allow Spanish firms to do what
Spanish corporations had been doing for decades. Yet we see, empirically, a major shift towards the
SRL in the 1920s. Why?
Our story is related to a more general interest in the differences between common-law and civillaw traditions. An influential literature argues that countries with a civil-law legal tradition do worse
in fostering a climate that leads to investment, and more generally in economic growth. La Porta et al
(1997, 1998, 1999) (or “LLSV”) use cross-country regression models to study differences between
countries with civil-law origins and those with common-law origins. They generally find that
common-law countries enjoy better protection for corporate investors and other features associated
with better capital markets and more rapid economic growth.1 Their argument echoes a long tradition
that emphasizes the ability of common-law judges to devise sensible solutions to new and specific
problems implicit in the cases that come before them. This feature of the common law supposedly
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Much of the follow-up to their work has debated the precise definition of the relevant legal families Most
research in this literature sees the “German” and “Scandinavian” versions of the civil law as better for economic
growth than the “French version.” That distinction is not relevant to our paper; Spain is clearly a “French
version” civil-law country.
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makes it more flexible than the civil law. The civil-law reliance on statutory changes involves too
much time or is too easily hijacked by special interests to produce necessary outcomes, LLSV argue.
LLSV and their critics typically focus on legislation relevant to large corporations and publicallytraded securities. The more general law of business organization at issue here provides less comfort to
the LLSV argument. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) show in the context of failed attempts to
introduce the limited partnership in the U.S. that the common law can also produce conservatism: if
judges are uneasy with a legal innovation, they can construe the new law so narrowly as to make the
innovation useless as a real reform. Similarly, Guinnane, Harris, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2007)
note that a few U.S. states introduced a form similar to the German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter
Haftung (GmbH) in the 1870s (before the “real” GmbH was introduced in 1892), but that the form
was never really used. They argue that this reflects the combination of common-law interpretation and
federalism; judges in one state held the new form to be a corporation, while judges in other states held
it to be a partnership, making it difficult for business people to know how the law would treat their
investments if they used the new form. The German GmbH itself is inconsistent with the LLSV view
of the civil law in two ways. First, the GmbH was itself a major innovation, but was introduced first in
a civil-law country. Second, a major change that made the GmbH more popular was the product of a
court decision in 1911, and not written into the actual statute until 1980.2
At the heart of the LLSV argument is the idea that codified law is inherently rigid. Because
common-law judges can make decisions that either overrule or anticipate statutory law, the argument
goes, business people in common-law countries can expect the legal order to adapt more rapidly to
their needs. This literature relies heavily on a particular characterization of “civil law” and “common”
law traditions. We show that the Spanish case does not fit the LLSV image of civil-law rigidity. Two
differences between Spanish law and the civil-law template (as described by LLSV) are especially
important. First, the Spanish business law lacks the numerus clausus feature that in most civil-law
countries limits the range of organizational forms to those specified in the code. Spanish firms could
create their own legal form. In most other civil-law jurisdictions, a business firm had to choose from a

2

The change in question is allowing legal persons such as the GmbH to be a partner in a partnership. This
legalized the GmbH & Co. KG, which is now one of the most popular legal forms in Germany.
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fixed menu of legal forms. Second, Spanish company law in practice was very malleable. Notaries in
some cases enabled clients to adopt practices that were at best legally dubious, and these same
notaries were effective at lobbying the legislature for the legal changes their clients wanted. This great
flexibility is reflected in the way the SRL was created. Without any changes in the commercial code,
the Commercial Register announced in 1919 that it would approve registration of SRLs. Inscription in
the Commercial Register is fundamental, as it gives the firm legal existence. Thus from 1919 the SRL
was a real fact, even if it was not mentioned in the commercial law. The SRL did not appear in any
legislation until 1951.
Our discussion is divided into three parts. We first explain how the menu of permitted forms
affects the decisions entrepreneurs make in setting up multi-owner firms. We then turn to a brief
survey of Spanish commercial law, focusing on the treatment of companies and enterprise form. We
then use three distinct empirical sources to study the way Spanish firms used these choices.

1. Why enterprise form matters
The legal form of enterprise frames the way investors in multi-owner firms combine their assets
and effort to create new companies and thus promote economic growth.3 We organize our discussion
around a trade-off detailed in Guinnane, Harris, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2007, 2008). Firms face
two central contracting issues: the problem of untimely dissolution and the problem of minority
oppression. Untimely dissolution means that firm-specific, illiquid investments may not realize their
full return if the death or withdrawal of an investor can provoke the firm’s demise. More importantly,
if an investor can threaten to withdraw from the enterprise and thus provoke the firm’s end as a way to
secure a greater share of the firm’s profits, then the enterprise may be unworkable from the start.
Minority oppression arises when one group of investors cannot prevent others from engaging in
actions with private benefits that at the same time reduce the value of the shares owned by the
minority. The oppressor can be other investors, the firm’s management, or both.

3

Throughout we discuss multi-owner firms only, since our focus is on contracting problems. We acknowledge
that multi-owner firms were a minority of all businesses.
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Partnerships, because they are essentially contracts between one or more people, are always
vulnerable to untimely dissolution. On the other hand, investors in this form can limit the possibility
of minority oppression, because partners are free to contract on key matters such as the right to make
decisions. Corporations represent the opposite extreme in both dimensions. Investments in
corporations are locked-in. Investors can only withdraw their capital by selling their shares to
someone else. On the other hand, corporations are especially vulnerable to minority oppression. Their
concentrated management allows the management to abuse their insider status against all owners, and,
depending on the voting rules associated with shares, majority owners can shape firm policy to suit
private ends.
In most countries, firms had to select from one or the other extreme of this trade off. Only with
the introduction of more flexible limited-liability forms could all investors enjoy limited liability and
also contract flexibly to achieve the structure that most suited their firm.4 In Spain the situation was
different. Prior to the introduction of the SRL in 1919, Spanish firms also had to choose between
corporations and partnerships. And, just as elsewhere, the Spanish version of the PLLC (the SRL)
allowed firms to manage the trade-off between untimely dissolution and minority oppression more
precisely. On the other hand, even Spanish corporations enjoyed a great deal of flexibility. So while
the SRL mattered (as we show empirically) it represented a less dramatic change in the trade-off than
was the case with the introduction of the German GmbH or the British PLC.

2. The legal framework
The tremendous attention given throughout the 19th century to commercial legislation in Spain
was disproportionate to the country’s weak industrial development. At several points, Spain adopted
decisions that ran far in advance of law in other, more developed countries, but these innovations
failed to lead to the hoped-for results. Before the first real Commercial Code of 1829, Spain had a
plural corpus juris. Most accounts stress the priority of the “Bilbao Ordinance,” promulgated by the
Bilbao Consular Trade Office, which enjoyed international prestige in part because of Bilbao’s
4

Guinnane et al (2007) use the general rubric “Private Limited-Liability Company” (PLLC) for the British
Private Limited Company, the German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), and the French Société
à Responsabilité Limitée (SARL)).
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important trading status. The Ordinance described three types of commercial companies: the ordinary
partnership, the limited partnership, and the corporation. In the ordinary partnership, all partners had
unlimited liability and participated in running the firm. The limited partnership, which was an
association of “foreign character” (E. De Tapia, 1839, p.13), combined two types of owners: limited
partners, who had limited liability for the firm’s debts and general partners, who contributed capital,
business knowledge and labor, and had unlimited liability for the firm’s obligations. Limited partners
could not play any role in firm management, a rule common for limited partnerships in most
jurisdictions. The term “corporation” at the time of the Bilbao Ordinance refers to business
organizations without a corporate name and that were in essence private. These companies’ objectives
were one-off and their duration limited to the completion of a particular task set forth in the founding
agreement (C. Petit 1980, p. 56).
Between the Ordenanzas de Bilbao (1737) and the Código de Comercio (Code of Commerce)
(1829) Spain saw numerous proposals for the modernization and unification of its commercial law.
The code finally approved in 1829 first appeared during the (second) reign of Fernando VII.5
Compiled by the Francophile Sáinz de Andino, this proposal displays strong French influence,
although it also followed the tradition of Spanish commercial law as contained in the Ordinance of
Bilbao and the Castilian Acts.6 The new code mostly differed from the Ordinance of Bilbao and
earlier French law only in details. Liability in partnerships was to be joint and several. The code also
states that the partnership was not dissolved by the death of a member, so long as the partners did not
establish otherwise in their regulations or agreements. This clause makes it possible that the
partnership in Spain was less susceptible to the untimely-dissolution problem than were partnerships
elsewhere. The code did not explicitly define the limited partnership by shares, although this
possibility was mentioned in §275, which describes the manner in which the partnership capital can

5

He lived 1784-1833, was King in 1808 and again 1813-1833 (R. Sánchez Mantero, 2001).
Prior to the modern codes that begin in 1829, there was an attempt to compile all Spanish law, referred to as
the Novisima Compilation (1805-1829 [1975]). A substantial part of those acts come from the Kingdom of
Castile, before the unification of Spain as a modern country.
6
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be divided: “It can be divided into shares […] and the shares subdivided into coupons; which remain
subject to the rules established for this sort of company.”7
The (1829) Andino code stresses the principle of publicity: partnerships and limited
partnerships are legal when they are constituted by means of private agreements announced to third
parties. The Spanish code differed from the earlier French model in entrusting the registration of these
agreements with a new organisation, the Commercial Courts. §290 required that new firms be
inscribed in a general provincial Register, identifying the notary who wrote the articles of association,
the names of general partners, the firm’s duration, as well as a list of the partners with the power to
sign in the name of the company.
In one respect the 1829 Commercial code was novel: it introduced general incorporation to
Europe. The code stated that any group of investors who met the criteria enumerated in the code could
form a corporation. Elsewhere at the time, every corporation required a specific and idiosyncratic
grant from the state. The United Kingdom did not adopt general incorporation until 1844. In France
this development waited until 1863 (and a further relaxation in 1867). Most of the German states
retained a concession system until 1870. Only in the United States, where state legislatures were
liberal in granting corporate charters in the early nineteenth century, and several states had also
adopted general-incorporation statutes by 1860, was there anything like the provisions of the 18209
Spanish code that early.
Circumstances in Spain at the time were not favourable to the growth of the corporation. The
Industrial Freedom Law (20 January 1834) provided a second boost to the formation of companies,
and the loss of some Spanish colonies in 1827 led to the repatriation of capital and might have been
one stimulus to incorporation. But Spain remained locked in dynastic and civil war until 1840, and the
law was repealed in 1847. In addition, some complementary economic infrastructure (such as banks)
remained quite weak. The evidence suggests, however, that some entrepreneurs took advantage of the
freedom to incorporate. Bernal (2004) estimates, based on Madoz (1850)’s Diccionario Geográfico
7

The limited share partnership is a form in which the limited partnerships are represented by tradable shares.
The literature on France and Germany claims this form was common before the advent of general incorporation
because as a partnership, it did not require a charter, but that in its large incarnations it was a reasonable
substitute for a corporation. The empirical evidence on this form suggests it was not as widespread as claimed.
See Guinnane et al 2007.
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Estadístico Histórico as well as the Anuarios Estadístico de Spain, that the Andino code led to the
creation of about forty corporations (M. Bernal, 2004, p. 77)
At the end of the 1840s the government suspended the 1829 code and related commercial law.
On January 28th 1848 the government promulgated a new law requiring that both corporations and
partnerships by share receive royal approval. The decision reflects a general economic crisis that
started in 1845, which in Spain was accompanied by financial-market crises (P. Gómez de la Serna,
1878, pp. 21-49). The new Spanish stock exchange experienced a sharp decline in 1845, creating
mistrust in stock companies. Additional changes culminated in the law of 1848, which abolished
freedom of incorporation but offered exceptions, perhaps indicating political motives for control over
certain sectors. During the following decade, several laws were passed allowing the creation of
corporations in some sectors, including banking, mining and railways (G. Tortella, 1968, pp. 69-84)
(L. Padros de la Escosura, 1988) (C. Erro, 1995) (JR García López, 1994). The following decade saw
the incorporation of many banking firms.. An international economic crisis (1866) put an end to the
prosperity and led to another collapse in the Spanish stock market. The real economy also suffered,
with a halt to railway construction and a contraction of Catalonia’s textile industry. The economic
crisis provoked a military uprising that ended with the queen in exile and a new provisional
government. The new provisional government tried to promote economic and social modernisation.
The Royal Decree of 28 October 1869 provisionally re-established the 1829 code of commerce,
pending passage of a new law. The new law (1869) once again granted freedom of incorporation

(Diario de las Cortes Constituyentes. Apéndice, 11.10.1869)

Revising the Code of Commerce: the exception to the principle of numerus clausus
The new commercial code approved in 1885 had a long gestation, starting with a commission
formed in 1869. The 1885 code made only one significant change to the 1829 code’s treatment of
business firms: it abandoned the principle of numerus clausus in the menu of enterprise forms.8

8

Hansmann and Kraakman (2002, p. 373-420) discuss the principle of numerus clausus as it applies to property
rights.

9

Article 117 simply declares valid any company contract, in any form, so long as its provisions are not
expressly forbidden by law. 9 This meant that, unlike France or Germany, a Spanish firm did not have
to choose from a small set of well-defined business forms. Why was this modification introduced?
The drafting commission’s minutes do not contain any clear motives. The commission clearly was not
borrowing from French or other law in this respect, as most other European business codes had the
numerus clausus feature. 10
The 1885 code differed from law elsewhere primarily in its treatment of corporations. Some
scholars have stressed the lack of influence of the recent French company law on the 1885 Spanish
code. The French Corporations Act of 24 July 1867 reflected the greater importance of partnerships in
that country. The 1885 Spanish code also differs from developments elsewhere in that it kept
corporations in the business code; it did not “decode,” as took place in France, Germany, and
elsewhere. Spain was also successful in defining a totally modern corporation. The minimalistic
character of the articles governing corporations gave rise in Spain (more than in other countries) to
companies that were formally corporations, but did not correspond to the public service function
attributed to the corporation, until the law of 1951 established more specific guidelines.11

Reform without law: the SRL and the Commercial Register of 1919
In 1919, the commercial registry issued new regulations that in effect added a new legal form
in Spain. The new rules allowed notaries to create and register SRLs. Below we document an almost
immediate reaction to the new possibility, as the number of SRLs created each year soon supplanted
both types of partnership. The idea for this type of firm in Spain appeared, as we have already seen, as
early as 1869. The parliamentary debate in the 1880s over adoption of the 1885 Code also includes
9

“§117.- El contrato de compañía mercantil celebrado con los requisitos esenciales del derecho, será válido y
obligatorio entre los que lo celebren, cualesquiera que sea la forma, condiciones y combinaciones lícitas y
honestas con que lo constituyan, siempre que no están expresamente prohibidas en el código”
10
One feature of the 1885 code warrants mention in light of later developments. Some commentators discussed
the limited partnership as particularly important for economic activity: “When what is needed is to exploit a
factory, create a manufacturing business or promote an invention, it is necessary to combine united
management, spontaneous action, correct and opportune measures and complete freedom” (J.M. Ros Biosca,
1886,, p. 123). At the end of the code project (1883), Fabra (a member of parliament) drew on the same idea in
introducing his proposed “partnership with limited liability.” This idea did not go further, but the proposal
suggests that discussion of what became the SRL started decades earlier.
11
Girón Tena (1986, 206) notes that §158 of the 1885 Business Code appears as §309 of the 1829 Business
Code

10

demands for the new form. By the first decade of the twentieth century, a group of intellectuals drew
on both German and more often British models, actively discussing the pros and cons of both the new
form and the specific rules it should require. Participants in these discussions took different and
changing positions, but all stressed, in arguing for the new form, the value of flexibility in organizing
multi-owner firms. The SRL’s advocates thought the 1885 code was sufficiently flexible that adding a
new form would work well, but wanted explicit definition of the new form to create certainty over
how it would be used. Opponents of the SRL thought the 1885 code offered the corporation enough
flexibility that it could be used as written for small companies and family enterprises; no new form
was needed. There was also some concern over possible confusion of the SRL with the limitedliability partnership. Two well-articulated proposals offered in the second decade of the twentieth
century provided structure to these debates. In 1914, the Academia Jurídica Catalana (Catalan Legal
Academy) proposed a law reproducing many of the features of the corporation, but with fewer
administrative and organisational obligations. In 1918, ex-minister Roig y Vergada offered an even
more detailed proposal, one that languished because of political circumstances.
The preamble to the Commercial Register’s new 1919 regulations refers to then-active
debates about the SRL, implying that it was giving into considerable pressure in allowing the new
form. (It does not describe that pressure’s source). The new rules state that a primary objective in the
new regulations was to clarify the role of the 1885 code’s §127. This article stipulates that investors in
an ordinary partnership all have unlimited liability for the firm’s debts. The 1919 regulations stated
that §117 (on freedom of contracts) allowed the creation of firms not subject to §127. (Note once
again the role of numerus clausus here; the registry was arguing that those firms had the right to
“make up” their own new form distinct from what was enumerated in the code.) The registry stated
that the SRL was a distinct type of company and not subject to §127. As a precaution, however, it
recommended that SRLs avoid any name that would lead to confusion with other forms (Gaceta de
Madrid, 26.9.1919, p. 1020).12 §108 of the new regulations held that an SRL could be registered
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“por entender algunos que con ellas se infringía el precepto del artículo 127 del Código de Comercio, que
establece la responsabilidad ilimitada de los socios colectivos, bien miradas las cosas se ve que no puede existir
tal infracción si a la Sociedad de responsabilidad limitada no se la denomina sociedad colectiva, dado que sólo a
esta clase de sociedades es aplicable es referido precepto. No hay, pues, motivo legal alguno para negar la
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under its corporate name “as long as it was not called “partnership”, “limited partnership”, or
“corporation.” Instead, the SRL had to include the terms “limited company” “limited liability
company” or some analogous phrase in its name, to signal the limitation of liability for its partners”
(Gaceta de Madrid, 28.9.1919, p. 1060).13
And there the law stood until 1951, when the SRL was first the subject of explicit legislation.
There were earlier efforts at reform, however. In 1926, Spain established a commission to draft a new
commercial code to supplant that of 1885. Although its efforts did not result in new law, its
discussions reveal considerable diversity of opinion about the proper role and nature of the SRL.
Many of the reforms offered for the SRL appear either in the German GmbH (established in 1892) or
its close cousin, the French SARL (1925). For example, members of the Spanish drafting commission
proposed minimum capital for the SRL, limitations on transfers of SRL ownership (to make the shares
less liquid), and some governance rules the firm could not contract out of (for example, the right of
super-majorities to over-rule management in some cases). These proposals may reflect on the way
contemporaries thought of the SRL and the way in which it was used, but, as the 1926 code never
came to fruition, the rules governing the creation of firms documented here remained those of the
1885 code.14

3. Choice of enterprise form: three empirical sources
Which enterprise forms did Spanish firms choose, and how did they use all this flexibility? To
answer these questions we have assembled three distinct datasets that allow us to study the decisions
firms made in this dimension. As is often the case with historical data, our sources do not provide
precisely what we want, but together they yield a remarkable picture. We use the first source to gain
an overview of the number and sizes of the different types of firms in Spain, as well as their

admisión en el Registro Mercantil de estas sociedades, constituidas al amparo del §117 del código de comercio,
que declara válido y obligatorio todo contrato de compañía mercantil celebrado con los requisitos esenciales del
derecho, cualesquiera que sean la forma, condiciones y combinaciones lícitas y honestas con que lo constituyan,
siempre que no estén expresamente prohibidas en el código” (Gaceta de Madrid, 26.9.1919, p.p. 1020)
13
Shortly after its introduction, the SRL was included with other firms in a reform of business taxation. C.
Betrán Pérez (1999, p. p. 119-135).
14
The minutes of the drafting commission are reproduced in J. F. Lasso Gaite (1999, pp. 550-570). A critical
interpretation of this project is in N. Pérez Serrano (1926, p. 335-361)
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geographic location. We use the other two to dig into the specific features that led a firm to be
organized in one way versus another.
Appendix A describes these sources in detail; here we provide a brief overview. All three
databases are based on the registration of new firms with the Commercial Court. The first source
consists of annual, province-level totals of the number of firms organized as each legal form, along
with the total capital in these firms, for the period 1886-1936. This aggregate source, which we call
the Annuarios, provides a rare complete picture of how firms organized. The Annuarios are based on
published sources. The second source we collected ourselves from the archives of five of Spain’s
fifty-one commercial registries. For a random sample of firms we abstract information from the
articles of association that describe a firm’s legal form, the number and names of its owners, its
business activity, and other matters. We focused on these five provinces because the documents are
physically available only in these places; a “Spanish” random sampling strategy would have been
prohibitively expensive. For each of these five provinces, we randomly selected two firms from each
year, again for the period 1886-1936. The resulting dataset, while rather small, supports detailed
questions about the determinants of legal form for our entire period.15 We refer to this source as the
Articles. Our third source is based on the articles of association for every firm organized in Spain in
the years 1925-1927. This source, which we call the Association data, has firm-level information on
legal form, total invested capital, and the firm’s sector. While the dataset has more firms than Articles,
the (published) Association source contains only a subset of the variables available in the Articles
data. This limitation reflects the underlying publication.
We must stress some limitations on what is possible, given the underlying source. Attributes
such as capital stock or number of owners could and probably did, in some cases, change over the
firm’s life. The total capital stock listed is the capital authorized in the articles of association. For
partnerships and the SRL, this sum reflects a real figure for which the owners were potentially
responsible to creditors. We do not know how much was paid in, in the case of corporations, nor do
we know about later increases or decreases in capital. Our estimates of capital and the number of
owners for corporations are questionable for this reason. In addition, our sources do not tell us
15

We are currently expanding this part of our database to include more provinces.
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anything about a firm’s subsequent survival. Some firms probably failed fairly soon after their
registration; even the Annuarios portrays flows and not stocks of firms.

4. An overview of choice of legal form in Spain
We begin with an overview of the way Spanish firms used their choices of legal form. The
Annuarios provide two variables for each province-year combination: the number of firms of each
type, and the total capital invested in such firms. Figure 1 reports for all of Spain the distribution of
firm registrations, by legal form, over our period. The patterns were fairly stable until the introduction
of the SRL in 1920. The vast majority of firms in 1886 were ordinary partnerships, with a small but
stable fraction organized as limited partnerships. Corporations accounted for a relatively small portion
of new firms, although that portion grew throughout our period. The SRL’s introduction in 1919
nearly eliminated the limited partnership. The combination of the new SRL and the growing role of
the corporation also made the ordinary partnership considerably less popular than in the past. By
1936, less than one-fifth of all new Spanish firms were ordinary partnerships, and the corporation and
SRL accounted for nearly equal shares, at about 40 per cent of all new firms each.
Figure 2 reports the allocation of capital invested across the different enterprise forms.
Corporations usually account for at least sixty per cent of all capital invested in new firms in a given
year. When introduced, the SRL remained small, accounting for much less of total capital than in
numbers. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 highlights an important fact to keep in mind with all these
comparisons; corporations were ordinarily huge compared to partnerships. In 1900, for example, the
average new corporation had a capital of 1.1 million pesetas, while the average new ordinary
partnership had a capital of 34.9 thousand pesetas. On the other hand, we should not assume all
corporations were huge and all partnerships were tiny. Also in 1900, in one-quarter of Spanish
provinces the average new corporation had a capital of 133 thousand pesetas or less, while in onequarter of provinces the average new ordinary partnerships had a capital of 172 thousand pesetas or
more.
In all that follows we must bear in mind another important feature of Spanish firms: the
overwhelming weight of Barcelona and Madrid in Spanish commercial life, especially for
14

corporations. Figure 3 presents the total number of corporations registered in Spain, as well as the
same figures for Barcelona and Madrid. Between them, Barcelona and Madrid often account for more
than half of all new Spanish corporations. This dominance of Madrid and Barcelona is peculiar to the
corporation and does not extend to other legal forms. Figure 4 shows capital invested in corporations.
Here we see that while Barcelona and Madrid were home to a disproportionate share of all
corporations, those firms were not always the largest corporations in Spain. In 1900, for example, the
average corporation registered in Barcelona had 885 thousand pesetas authorized capital, and in
Madrid in that year, 784 thousand pesetas. The three corporations registered in Seville in that year had
an average capital of more than 4 million pesetas.16
The reasons for Madrid and Barcelona’s role for corporations are not hard to find. As the
national capital, Madrid was the logical headquarters for firms that had or aimed to have a national
reach. Barcelona held a similar position for the Catalan region, a relatively heavily-industrialized part
of Spain. Barcelona and Madrid also account for a large share of all new partnerships and SRLs, but
nothing like their domination for corporations. This is as we expect; smaller firms worked in a more
local environment, and had little reason to be far from customers or owners. In any case, the
importance of Barcelona and Madrid require caution in all that follows.
Maps 1-4 present more information on the geographic distribution of firms in Spain. The units
here are Spain’s provinces, and the population as of 1900 is used in population normalizations. Map 1
suggests that part but not most of the role of Barcelona and Madrid in corporations reflects their large
populations. Even when we normalize by provincial populations, these two provinces stick out.
Between 1886 and 1914, the number of Spanish corporations increased, but their numbers (but not
capital) became even more concentrated, on a per-capita basis, in Madrid and Barcelona. Maps 2 and
4 report the distribution of the two kinds of partnerships. In 1886, both were much less concentrated
than the corporation, as noted. Comparing Maps 2 and 4 shows that the limited partnership’s decline
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Madrid and Barcelona dominate the creation of new corporations over this period, but not in every single
year. In all Barcelona was home to 4088 new corporations and Madrid to 2511; but one can find years in which
more corporations were created in another province. In 1900, for example, Vizcaya gained 55 new corporations,
topping Madrid (29 new corporations) and Barcelona (14 new corporations).
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was concentrated in Spain’s south-western provinces; the geographical distribution of the ordinary
partnership, on the other hand, changed little in the period prior to World War I.

5. The choice of legal form
Our central interest is how specific types of firms decided on one of the legal forms available
to them. To study this issue we have two different firm-level databases, the Articles and the
Association data. We find it useful to divide the discussion into two regimes, before and after the SRL
became available. Prior to the SRL’s introduction, there were three different margins, between the two
types of partnerships, and then between the corporation and each type of partnership. The SRL
introduced the margins to six. Given the information available, we can organize this question under a
few headings:


What is the role of size, measured as capital, in the choice of legal form? Following the
literature, we suspect that the largest firms prefer the corporation because limited-liability
and liquid shares facilities raising capital from a large number of dispersed investors. For
similar reasons, firms needing more capital are more likely to become a limited
partnership, as opposed to an ordinary partnership.



How does the number of owners affect the choice of legal form? For very large numbers
of owners the corporation might be the only workable form, but we do not think our
measures actually capture this dimension correctly for corporations. Among the two
partnership forms, the ability of a limited partner to invest without great risk suggests that
partnerships with more owners will be limited partnerships.



How do family ties among owners affect legal form decisions? The liquidity of corporate
shares make it less attractive for families that seek to keep control of an enterprise, and in
any case, it is unlikely that the many dozens or even hundreds of share-holders can be
restricted to a family group. Family connections are more important in choosing among
partnership forms. We suspect that if all owners are related, they are more likely to choose
the ordinary partnership. Joint holding of assets at the household level, as well as risksharing within families, implies that it makes little sense for one family member to have
limited liability in a firm in which another has unlimited liability. On the other hand,
limited partnerships offer a vehicle for family members to seek investment from unrelated
persons.



How does the firm’s underlying activity affect the choice of legal form? (In our data, we
are forced to use the firm’s sector as a proxy for its activity.) Businesses sensitive to
untimely dissolution, we predict, will prefer the corporation. Such businesses would
include any entity that had sunk investments that pay off only over time. We have no
prediction for how sector would affect the decision between the two partnership forms.
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The SRL changes these margins in several ways. The SRL did not have access to capital markets in
the same way as a corporation, so firms with large numbers of owners would still prefer the corporate
form. But, given its locked-in capital, a larger SRL might be a closer substitute for a corporation than
for firms that anticipated a large capital stock in a firm with a smaller number of owners. As for
family ties among owners, the SRL would be a closer substitute for the partnership forms. Finally, we
expect the SRL to edge out partnership forms in areas where the firm’s activity makes untimely
dissolution a special concern.
Note that in this analysis, we focus on choice of legal form, and not on contracting decisions
owners make within a given legal form. This second issue remains at the heart of our agenda, but the
Association source provides little useful information on key contracting decisions. Digging into how
Spanish entrepreneurs used the flexibility of a given legal form must wait on our enlargement of the
Articles database. For now we know that the Spanish corporation was unusually flexible, and this
flexibility must have made it a closer substitute for other legal forms in some circumstances.

An overview of the databases
The Articles provide firm-level information for a randomly-selected group of enterprises in
Barcelona, Madrid, Murcia, A Coruña and Vizcaya. These provinces reflect the diversity of the
Spanish economy in our period: a pioneering city in the industrialization of the 19th century in the
textile sector (Barcelona) and in the industrial sector (Vizcaya), a city dedicated to government and
services (Madrid), a port city (A Coruña) and a centre focused on agricultural export and with a strong
mining sector (Murcia). For each firm we extracted the date of the firm’s creation, its legal form, the
capital contributed by each owner, and indicators of family ties among the several owners, and a
classification of the firm’s main line of business or sector.
Table 1 presents an overview of the Articles sample, showing the number of firms of each
type in each province. We also include the proportions of each type of firm implied by the Annuarios,
as a rough check on the sampling strategy. In most cases, our sample of two firms per year yields a
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distribution of legal forms that is tolerably close to that implied by the Annuarios.17 Table 2 reports
basic characteristics of the firms in this database, by legal form. Recall that for corporations, the
number of owners is simply those who were part of the initial filing; we cannot say what happened to
ownership thereafter. The two “family” variables were constructed on the basis of surnames and
internal references (for example, “and his son...”) and probably understate the true weight of family
connections in firms. We probably fail to detect some relatives “in law” as well as married sisters.
Note that limited partnerships were larger (measured by both number of owners and by capital) than
ordinary partnerships, with SRLs in between. The role of family in ownership is more complicated.
Limited partnerships have more family involvement, but are less likely to consist solely of family
members.
Table 3 reports our effort to classify firms into sectors. Our sector groups are an idiosyncratic
adaptation to the size and character of this sample. We started with the scheme used by the CNAE
(Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas: National Classificacion of Economic
Activities)18 and combined related sectors until the scheme was manageable for our purposes.
Corporations dominate two sectors, mining and the heterogeneous category of agriculture, utilities,
and construction. This pattern probably reflects capital requirements. Within a given sector, firms
organized as corporations have dramatically larger total capital investments. In the manufacturing
sector, for examples, corporations were organized with an average of 4.7 million pesetas capital.
Manufacturing firms with other legal forms had an average of 73 thousand pesetas in capital.
Table 4 shifts to the Association database, reporting the number of firms by form and their
size (measured by mean capitalization). The Association source is similar to the Articles. But it
contains over 3200 firms, formed in the years 1925-1927 only. The Association source reports less
information than we extracted from the articles of association for the Articles; most importantly, the
Association data lack information on the number of owners and their family connections. The main
17
See the Appendix for discussion of sampling challenges. With these sample sizes, the standard error of the
proportion of firms in a given enterprise form can be very large. Consider Madrid, where 54 percent of our firms
but only 36 percent of all firms in the Annuarios dataset are corporations. The standard error of a proportion .54
in a total sample of 96 firms is about .05.
18
A discussion of the CNAE can be found at:
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do;jsessionid=47757905616C69F3FB75D4DA2F07F903.jaxi02?type=pcaxis&pat
h=/t40/clasrev&file=inebase&L=1 [22.3.2012]
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value of this source is that it allows us to look in more detail at a period after the SLR was fully
normalized. We saw earlier that the limited partnership became rare during the 1920s. Table 4 shows
that the remaining limited partnerships were larger than the SRL and much larger than the ordinary
partnerships.19
Table 5 presents an overview of legal form by sector once again in the Association data. Once
again we construct a sector classification scheme that starts from the published Spanish tables, and
collapses firms into like categories to achieve a manageable number of groups. The scheme used here
is too detailed for our econometric analysis below, but this level of detail is useful for seeing the
popularity of the different forms by sector. The corporation, not surprisingly, dominates in most areas
where one would expect large capital requirements, including extraction and utilities. (The category
“clubs” includes some social organizations, where apparently the ease of issuing corporate shares to
members made it an attractive form.) Ordinary partnerships retained their importance for retail firms
and for some light manufacturing, including shoes, textiles, and furniture. This form also continued to
dominate agency firms. The SRL’s appeal was very broad, with significant numbers in most of our
categories. This may be one reason the limited partnerships had completely disappeared in some
areas, and lack a commanding presence in any sector.

Multivariate approaches
Our samples are too small to use table to examine multiple dimensions at once. What we
really want to know is whether firms in a given sector in a given province with a specific capital size
were more likely to choose one legal form over another. To address this kind of question we use a
simple multivariate econometric model, the multinomial logit (MNL).20 MNL estimates reflect the
probability of selecting each legal form relative to another specified as the baseline, which we assume
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G.W. McDonogh (1989 [1986]) claims that the treatment of inheritance under Catalan civil law made the
limited partnership relatively more attractive there. Perhaps, but our data do not support that view; while limited
partnerships were more common in Barcelona, the difference between that province and the rest of Spain is not
large. In 1925 and 1926, about 10 percent of all firms organized in Barcelona were limited partnerships. In
1927 that figure had fallen to 4.5 percent.
20
The approach used here is similar to those employed by Gómez-Galvarriato and Musacchio (2006) as well as
Abramitsky, Frank, and Mahajan (2010).
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is the ordinary partnership. The MNL model has the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA)
feature that the estimates for each binary choice here (that is, corporation versus ordinary partnership,
limited versus ordinary partnership) are the same as we would obtain from estimating two separate
binary-logit models. The choice of baseline form also does not affect properly-constructed tests of the
effect of coefficients in the model.21
In many discrete-choice applications the IIA property is a problem, as it implies an
implausible restriction on underlying choice behaviour. Here we doubt that it has an undesired effect;
a firm deciding between two kinds of partnership probably does not care where the corporation is
another option. But in future work we will explore alternative modelling choices to make sure our
results are robust.
We begin with the Articles. Table 6 reports a multinomial logit model of the choice of legal
form, given the firm’s sector, the number of investors, and its total capital. We restrict the sub-sample
to the years before 1920, to focus on the period when the SRL was not available. The baseline
outcome is the ordinary partnership. One could worry that the number of owners and the total capital
invested are possibly endogenous, and we would agree, but with sample sizes of this sort there is little
we could do about the problem. More capital and more owners led entrepreneurs away from the
ordinary partnership, either to the corporation or to the limited partnership. The effect of more owners
is about the same for the two alternatives (the Wald test for the null hypothesis of equal coefficients is
0.6, p=.44), while the capital effect is larger for corporations, which should not surprise (the Wald test
is 3.8, p=.05). The trend towards corporations noted earlier in connection with the Annuarios is also
apparent here, even holding other variables constant.
The dummies for province probably pick up a number of influences, including differences in
firm activity not captured by the sector dummies. Collectively, the place dummies matter (Wald is
25.77, p=0). Being in either Madrid or Murcia makes the corporation much more likely than in the
omitted province, Barcelona. This result does not contradict the discussion above; by controlling for
firm size and sector, we are pulling out some of the factors that made Barcelona home to so many
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Specifically: one can test for the equality of a given coefficient on the “corporations” and “SRL” branches and
obtain the same results, regardless of the choice of baseline.
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corporations. The sector dummies tell an interesting tale. We have further collapsed them because of
the need to divide the sample at the year 1920, to account for the SRL’s introduction. Here the
omitted category is especially heterogeneous, but our primary interest is in comparing sector effects
across the two equations (for corporations and for limited partnerships). First, we can reject the null
hypothesis that the sectors do not matter collectively in general (the Wald statistic is 19.8, p=0) or for
corporations only (the Wald statistic is 15.02, p=0), but not for the limited partnerships (the Wald is
1.7 with p=.42). Investors were less likely, ceteris paribus, to decide on a corporation for
manufacturing and trading firms. The former is surprising, as one would think the problem of
untimely dissolution would affect manufacturing firms that had specific investments in plant and
worker training. The result may reflect the nature of manufacturing firms in Spain at the time; most
are in light-manufacturing areas, where the costs of liquidating equipment would be relatively low.
None of our firms (in this sample) are steel or other firms where one would expect heavy, firmspecific investments. Sector does not affect the choice between the two kinds of partnerships, which
may not be surprising. The main difference there is liability, and there is little reason to think that
sectors as we define them have any bearing on liability.
We also see clear differences in the decisions made by firms with a family component.
Owners who include family members are much less likely to decide on the corporate form than on the
ordinary partnership. This result is what we expected. The choice between the two partnership forms
is more complex. Entrepreneurs with some family members are more likely to decide on a limited
partnership; if the entire group is family, then they are more likely to decide on an ordinary
partnership. These “family” effects are very large. Including some family members raises the
probability of choosing the limited partnership form by .17 (compared to an unconditional mean value
of the dependent variable of 0.16); if all investors are family remembers, the probability is declines by
0.09. This effect probably reflects the suggestion in the literature that limited partnerships were often
used by family firms to bring in an outside investor.
Table 7 reports a similar model for the period 1920 onwards, when the SRL was a fourth
organizational possibility. This model differs from that reported in Table 7 because of a new
alternative, and it is important to be clear about how this alternative matters. Econometrically,
21

dropping the SRL “branch” (and all SRLs) from the estimation in Table 7 would not affect the other
estimates. But the decision to organize as a limited partnership or corporation reflects, in part, the
existence of the SRL. That is, the actual data would be different had there been no SRL. Several
results stand out. The time trend suggests the slow demise of the limited partnership, as the
corporation and SRL become more and more popular. Larger firms measured by capital are more
likely to decide on the corporate form, but not other forms, while starting with more owners has no
effect on legal form. The sector dummies once again show interesting relationships with legal form.
We can reject the null that they are all zero (Wald is 13.33, p=.04), but this appears to be driven by the
corporations, for which the test statistic for both sector dummies being zero is 10.86 (p=0). We also
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sector effects are the same across all three outcomes. The
effect of family links among owners show that the limited partnership is favoured among investors
who are mostly family but want to bring in some outsiders. This effect remains even after the SRL’s
introduction. The SRL distinguishes itself most strongly from the ordinary partnership in the effect of
family relations among owners: here, if all investors are related, the SRL is an unlikely choice. We
need to explore this finding more, but it suggests that for families the SRL was used as something
distinct from a sort of partnership where all had limited liability.
Given the limitations imposed by our sample size, it would be rash to draw strong conclusions
from these results. But some patterns do stand out. The gradual trend in favour of the corporation (and
after 1920, the SRL) are not just compositional effects, they remain even when we control for firm
size, sector, and location. The effect of firm size (owners or capital) appears limited to corporations;
the choice of form between one of the partnerships, or between the ordinary partnership and the
corporation, is driven by other considerations. And sector matters most in the decision to form a
corporation, once again suggesting that the contracting issues that lead to one of the other forms is not
much affected by the sector in which the firm operates. Finally, the family patterns noted in
connection with the earlier period are evident here; groups of investors consisting of some family
have a strong preference for the limited over the ordinary partnership. Groups consisting entirely of
family have a strong preference for the ordinary partnership over the SRL. This last finding awaits

22

further refinement with the enlarged sample, but clearly shows that the SRL played a role, in at least
some cases, distinct from the partnership forms.

We now turn to the Association Mercantile data, which permits more detailed examination of
firm choices after the introduction of the SRL. Table 8 reports a model similar to those shown earlier.
Once again the baseline legal form is the ordinary partnership. The year dummies indicate the growth
in the SRL’s popularity; even controlling for capital, sector, and region, the dummy for 1926 is
positive and significant, and that for 1927 is nearly double the size of the 1926 dummy.22 The
probability of choosing a limited partnership declined (conditionally) between 1925 and 1927. The
effect of capital shows that SRLs were better-suited to smaller enterprises than was the corporation.
The marginal effect of capital for a corporation is .06, while for an SRL it is -.02. Both marginal
effects are estimated precisely. The regions are collectively significant in each branch of the model,
and we see that limited partnerships are extremely rare in some provinces.
We have further collapsed the sector classification scheme over that used in Table 7,
combining several smaller primary and service sectors. (The earlier scheme implied too many sparse
for empty cells for the econometric model.) We can reject the null that the regions are collectively
insignificant in all branches of the model. The same goes for sectors taken together. Above we noted
that Barcelona played a pioneering role in creating the SRL. This status does not, however, translate
into the SRL being more common there than in other regions. About 20 per cent of all new firms in
the Association data in Barcelona are SRLs. This figure is far below several other regions; in Galicia,
40 per cent of new firms were SRLs. Our multinomial logit model implies that the marginal effect of a
firm being in Catalonia is .02; for Madrid, it is .42. This huge difference may reflect the other
variables in the model, that is, it might be that the sector composition of firms in Barcelona was
especially appropriate for the SRL. In any case, it provides no support for the view that Barcelona had
a special affinity for the SRL because of local civil law or the influence of local notaries.
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The marginal effect of moving from 1925 to 1927 increases the chance of an SRL by about 6 percent. We can
reject the null that the 1926 and 1927 dummies are the same in the SRL branch (the Wald is 3.45, p=.06).
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Our estimates do not support the view that untimely dissolution problems guided firm
decisions about the form of enterprise. The corporation dominates in some sectors where untimely
dissolutions would be especially acute, but the difference is not consistent. The two legal forms with
“locked in” capital, the corporation and the SRL, are not consistently more common in some sectors
where one would think untimely dissolution would be acute. Unfortunately, we lack for this source
the information on family ties that would allow a cross-check on the way firms dealt with untimely
dissolution. In future research we will experiment with different definitions of sectors, to see whether
the problem here is just the assignment of firms to categories that do not capture the firm’s reliance on
sunk investment.
Before concluding this discussion we should briefly discuss some other evidence that does
suggest concern with untimely dissolution. Firms had the option of stating in their articles of
association how long the firm would last. This variable is thus available, in principle, in both the
Articles and the Annuarios data. We do not (yet) know how courts interpreted these provisions, so
cannot say how binding they might have been. In any case, only about 40 per cent of the firms in the
Annuarios state a contractual duration. Among those that do, corporations have by far the longest
contracts (a median of 20 years, N=296). Ordinary partnerships and SRLs’ each have a median
duration of 6 years, with limited partnerships slightly longer at 8 years. Econometric analysis (not
reported) of the median contract duration turns up an intriguing result: holding constant firm capital,
year of registration, region and sector, we find that firms in the “chemicals and pharma” sector listed a
duration nearly three years longer than the baseline (food and drink). There are several possible
interpretations for this finding; one suggests a promising avenue of research, which is that firms in
this sector had more sunk investments in intellectual property and firm-specific human and physical
capital, and thus were more worried about a premature end of the project.

4. Conclusion
Our account of the development of Spanish company law in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century stressed its long tradition of flexibility, as well as the introduction of a completely
new form, the SRL, in 1919. Using three related empirical sources, we have documented the choice of
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legal forms entrepreneurs made within this system. This paper is a first step in our investigation of
Spanish law and the choice of enterprise form in Spain. Our next step, which awaits the enlarged
Articles database, will use the detailed provisions of the firm’s agreements to understand how
entrepreneurs used the options available to them within a given form. This enlarged version of the
Articles database used here will allow us to better-study the impact of the SRL on the choice of legal
form, as done here. And by digging in the articles of associations’ specific provisions were will gain a
better understanding of how firms tailored each form to their needs.
This paper has focused on the choice of one form over another. Our findings require
refinement, and but thus far we have clear evidence on several points. First, the corporation was less
uncommon in Spain than in some other civil-law jurisdictions such as France or Germany. This
ubiquity may reflect the flexibility of the Spanish law on corporations, and the opportunities it
afforded entrepreneurs to adapt the form to their own needs. Second, family groups in Spain preferred
the ordinary partnership for firms owned entirely by related people, and tended to use the limited
partnership to bring in unrelated investors. Third, the introduction of the SRL nearly wiped-out the
limited partnership, a pattern we see in France but not in Germany. Fourth, the very fact that the
SRL’s introduction had such a significant impact shows that it was in fact a new entity; the flexibility
of the corporation was not enough for entrepreneurs to create what they wanted without the SRL.
Finally, our econometric results stress the importance of firm size in the decision to use the
corporation over both partnership firms and the SRL. We have, as yet, no clear-cut evidence that
avoidance of partnership forms was motivated by concerns about untimely dissolution.
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Appendix A: Sources
This appendix provides more detail on the three data sets employed in the paper. Starting in
1886, Spain maintained an exhaustive register of companies inscribed in the Deed Books of the
commercial register in each province. The register files reflect the information provided by the firms
as they inscribe the creation of new firms. Each new entity was assigned a number, which it retained
for the life of the firm. The law required that changes in the articles of association also be registered.
These inscriptions underlie our three sources.

Annuarios
We constructed the Anuarios de la Dirección General del Registro y del Notariado (Yearbook
of the General Directorate of the Register and Notary) from three distinct publications: Estadística del
Registro Mercantile (1886-1898), published by the Dirección General de los Registros Civil y del
Notariado (Madrid, 1901); Estadística del Registro Mercantil (1899 – 1909), published by the
Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado (Section 4) (Madrid, 1911).; and Anuario de los
Registros y del Notariado, published by the Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado
(Madrid, continues to the present day).
These three references each list, at the province level, the number of firms registered by legal
form and total capital. The sources also divide firms by basic function: for example, which are banks,
which have some type of concession, which are mines, etc. This source has been used by several
scholars who have discussed its strengths and weaknesses (X. Tafunell, 2005). Earlier discussions
focus on two problems. First, the capital figures are always authorized (not paid-in) capital, so they
probably reflect an over-estimate for corporations especially. Second, in some cases when a firm
registered a branch offer, the registry listed that branch’s capital as the capital for the entire firm,
leading to double-counting at the national level and over-estimates for the province where the branch
was located.

Articles of association
26

To register a firm had to provide a copy of its articles of association, and those documents are
in principle open and available. Collecting and using this kind of sources is very expensive, so we
began with an initial sample of 500 firms, drawn from the registries of Madrid, Barcelona, Murcia, A
Coruña and Vizcaya. As a pseudo-randomization scheme we selected the first firm registered in
February and the first firm registered in July of each year. As noted in the text, because of incomplete
access to the archives, in some cases the resulting sample was fewer than 100 firms. The worst case is
Murcia, with only about 80 firms. For each of these firms we know the company name, its legal form,
the year and date it was created, the total capital (subject to the qualification noted earlier), its sector
classified according to CNAE-2009 (the national classification of economic activities), its planned
duration in years, and family relationships among the firm’s listed owners.23 We also know, for the
first three listed owners, name, profession, sex, capital contribution, and distribution of profits.

Association Mercantile
The third collection is based on an unusual source that unfortunately was only constructed for
three years. Starting in 1927, the Special Statistics Section of the General Directorate of Commerce,
Industry and Services published La Asociación Mercantil en España, a nominative list of all the
companies inscribed in the Commercial Register. Apparently this publication was to be maintained
indefinitely, but it only appeared for the years 1926, 1927, and 1928. This publication contains three
types of information regarding trading companies that (1) registered/constituted (2) dissolved and (3)
modified. The information supplied for each of the series is the following: province, corporate name,
legal form, duration, nature of business, capital, and paid-in capital.

Maps
Maps 1-4 report the geographic distribution of firms in several ways. The firm data is simply
the Annuarios discussed above. For the per-capita normalizations (the right-hand panel of Maps 1 and
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In our empirical work we divide these family relationships into 1 if all owners appear to be related; .5 if some
are related; and 0 if none are related. Since these scoring relies on family names as well as references in the text
(“… his brother Juan…”) they probably under-estimated family connections.
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3, as well as both panels in Maps 2 and 4) the provincial population estimates are for 1900. We
exclude the Spanish islands.
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Table 1: Legal form of firms in the Articles of Association sample and the Annuarios
Legal form
Corporation

Partnership

Limited Partnership

SRL

Number of
firms in the
Articles sample

Barcelona

20.2
(21)

57.4
(56)

14.9
(16)

7.5
(7)

94

Vizcaya

28.7
(25)

44.6
(55)

9.9
(5)

16.8
(14)

101

Coruna

12.0
(15)

47.8
(51)

17.4
(19)

22.8
(14)

92

Madrid

54.2
(36)

28.1
(46)

7.3
(11)

10.4
(8)

96

Murcia

34.2
(34)

53.9
(49)

9.2
(8)

2.6
(9)

76

Number of firms

137

211

54

57

459

Province

Note: The table presents row percentages of the percentage of all firms sampled in a given province that had a given
legal form. The figures in parenthesis are the corresponding totals from the Annuarios.

Source: Main figures computed from the Articles, numbers in parentheses from the Annuarios

Table 2: Characteristics of firms in the Articles sample

Number of
owners

Capital

Some family

All family

Legal form
Corporation

5.38

2737

0.13

0.09

Ordinary
partnership

2.74

68

0.07

0.27

Limited
partnership

3.98

135

0.28

0.17

SRL

2.95

96

0.14

0.04

Note: all figures are means. Capital is the median, in thousands of pesetas. “Some family” and “all
family” are indicator variables, where a value of one means at least some of the firm’s owners were
related (“some family”) or all owners were related (“all family”). The family categories are mutually
exclusive.

Table 3: Sector breakdown of different legal forms, Articles sample

Sectors
All firms
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Corporation

25
22
15
19.8 14.4 31.9

14
25
35
35 78.1 58.3

136
29.8

Ordinary partnership

72
84
22
17
5
11
57.1 54.9 46.8 42.5 15.6 18.3

211
46.0

Limited partnership

15
28
11.9 18.3

3
6.4

3
7.5

0
0

5
8.3

54
11.8

SRL

14
19
7
11.1 12.4 14.9

6
15

2
6.2

9
15

57
12.4

Total

126

40

32

60

458

153

47

Note: second figure in each cell is the column percentage.
Sectors: (1) Manufacturing (2) Trade (3) Hospitality and services (4) Finance and real estate (5) Mining (6)
agricultural processing, utilities, and construction

Table 4: Overview of firms in the Association Mercantile source

Number of firms, by legal form

Mean capital, by legal form

1925

1926

1927

All years

1925

1926

1927

Corporations

33.2

31.1

33.4

1,061

1155.97

929.05

1591.51

Partnerships

37.5

36.6

34.1

1,178

105.10

94.12

117.70

6.5

6.9

4.1

193

183.41

207.73

192.84

22.7

25.4

28.4

827

112.89

150.46

131.50

1,135

1,112

1,012

3,259

461.04

376.47

615.56

Limited partnerships
SRL
Number of firms

Note: Figures in left-hand panel are row percentages, that is, in 1925, 33.2 percent of all new firms organized as
corporations. Capital is in thousands of pesetas

Table 5: Sectors and the choice of legal form, 1925-1927

Primary
Extraction
Food and drink
Wood and paper
Textiles and shoes
Metallurgy
Wholesale
Retail
Chemicals and pharmaceutical
Mining
Energy and utilities
Transportation and warehouse
Hotels and restaurants
Publishing and advertising
Finance, Real Estate, and Insurance
Liberal professions
Agents
Manufacture of machinery
Construction
Automobiles
Personal services
Clubs
Furniture
Public administration
Number of firms

Corporation
50.0
65.5
39.3
18.1
26.5
23.8
36.7
7.5
45.4
25.3
69.8
42.5
28.3
47.7
56.7
46.4
9.5
39.0
44.1
31.1
25.7
83.3
20.5
15.9

Partnership
10.0
16.7
31.0
55.3
43.5
43.6
35.2
52.3
23.9
40.0
17.2
30.8
30.2
19.3
26.9
15.5
54.0
29.4
30.7
20.4
40.0
16.7
46.2
59.1

Limited Partnership
5.0
4.8
5.0
9.6
10.5
5.9
6.4
9.3
4.6
3.2
2.6
4.2
1.9
6.4
1.9
1.0
4.8
3.7
2.4
6.8
0.0
0.0
2.6
6.8

SRL
35.0
13.1
24.7
17.0
19.6
26.7
21.8
30.8
26.2
31.6
10.3
22.5
39.6
26.6
14.4
37.1
31.8
27.9
22.8
41.8
34.3
0.0
30.8
18.2

Number of firms
40
84
239
94
306
101
409
493
130
95
116
120
53
109
104
97
126
136
127
103
35
6
78
44

1,061

1,178

193

827

3245

Figures are row percentages. See text for discussion of sector definitions.

Source: Association database

Table 6: Choosing a legal form – before the SRL

Regressor

Corporations

Limited
partnerships

Estimate T-Ratio

Estimate T-Ratio

Number of owners

0.74

3.91

0.42

2.72

Capital

0.50

2.54

0.27

1.67

Sector dummies (reference is all other sectors):
Manufacture
-1.18
-2.54
Trade
-2.04
-3.69

0.09
0.56

0.16
1.07

Family connections among owners (reference is no
connection):
Some family
-1.40
-1.89
All family
-4.33
-3.43

1.01
-0.80

1.97
-1.41

Province dummies ( reference is Barcelona) :
Bilbao
0.44
Coruna
0.84
Madrid
2.24
Murcia
2.27

0.57
0.95
2.74
2.95

-0.95
0.15
-0.30
-1.44

-1.55
0.3
-0.49
-2.1

Year

0.09

3.71

0.00

-0.21

-173.75

-3.78

5.35

0.14

Constant term

There are 301 observations. The log-likelihood is -167.26. The Chi-square statistic for the null that all
estimates are zero is 89.44. Capital is in millions of pesetas.
Source: Articles database.

Table 7: Choosing a legal form: After the SRL

Corporation
Estimate T-Ratio
Number of owners
Total capital

0.40
0.41

Limited
partnership
Estimate T-Ratio

2.04
3.76

SRL
Estimate T-Ratio

0.16
-0.07

0.50
-0.41

-0.01
-0.05

-0.04
-0.38

0.33
0.43

0.26
0.36

-0.63
-0.75

0.99
-1.22

Family connections among owners (reference is no connection):
Some family
1.56
1.53
3.00
2.69
All family
-0.14
-0.16
1.54
0.99

0.80
-2.03

0.91
-2.32

Sector dummies (reference is all other sectors):
Manufacturing
-2.78
-3.06
Trade
-1.22
-1.95

Province dummies ( reference is Barcelona)
Bilbao
-0.53
-0.62
Coruna
-3.38
-2.47
Madrid
-0.14
-0.16
Murcia
-0.91
-1.15
Year
Constant

2.53
-0.25
-43.26
2.86

1.68
-0.18

1.30
1.09

1.68
1.49

1.69

-0.72

-0.78

0.11

1.73

-0.19

-1.67

0.14

2.67

-202.94

-1.73

363.29

1.66

-278.11

-2.67

There are 152 observations. The log-likelihood is -120.82. The chi-square statistic for the null that all
estimates are zero is 137.5. Capital is in millions of pesetas. SRLs in Madrid are completely determined
and had to be dropped from the model. Source is the articles database.

Table 8: Multinomial estimates of choice of legal form, Association Mercantile source
Corporation
Estimate T-ratio
Year of registration (1925 is reference)
1926
0.133
1.140
1927
0.166
1.360

Limited partnership
Estimate T-ratio

SRL
Estimate

T-ratio

0.142
-0.409

0.780
-1.910

0.199
0.417

1.710
3.500

-0.100
0.392
0.310
0.185
-0.601
0.629
-0.047
0.351
-0.190
0.513
-0.810
-0.520
0.753
-0.066
-0.554
-0.165

-0.300
0.840
0.680
0.200
-1.290
1.310
-0.130
1.860
-0.790
0.750
-2.080
-0.510
3.450
-0.200
-2.520
-0.230

-0.848
-32.240
-0.436
-31.922
0.265
0.042
-1.820
-0.042
-1.434
0.057
-1.696
-32.531
0.013
-0.753
-0.856
0.237

-1.330
-86.310
-0.550
-56.540
0.500
0.060
-1.720
-0.170
-3.010
0.050
-2.190
-58.550
0.040
-1.300
-2.650
0.290

0.844
0.868
1.075
0.829
0.244
1.208
0.063
0.677
0.508
0.558
1.242
1.489
1.055
1.261
1.362
0.610

2.430
1.650
2.340
1.030
0.500
2.520
0.140
3.030
1.900
0.630
4.090
2.510
4.220
4.020
6.060
0.840

Sector (Food and drink is reference)
Textile & Shoes
-1.015
-0.623
Metallurgy
Wholesale
-0.271
Retail
-2.001
Chemical & Pharma
0.433
0.457
Transport & Warehouse
0.710
Advertising & Publishing
0.228
Machinery
Construction
-0.073
Cars
0.595
Furniture
-0.647
Misc services
-0.178
0.261
Misc primary sector

-4.210
-1.810
-1.220
-7.370
1.500
1.580
2.150
0.810
-0.250
1.790
-1.900
-0.810
1.210

0.205
-0.083
0.043
0.150
0.115
0.083
0.661
-0.243
-0.766
0.924
-0.941
-0.768
0.073

0.550
-0.150
0.110
0.420
0.210
0.140
1.220
-0.430
-1.100
1.670
-1.180
-1.760
0.190

-0.632
-0.510
-0.345
-0.423
0.285
-0.184
0.452
0.103
-0.258
0.945
-0.273
-0.195
-0.264

-2.640
-1.670
-1.500
-2.010
0.920
-0.580
1.300
0.340
-0.840
2.770
-0.840
-0.890
-1.130

Constant

-2.960

-1.594

-3.910

-1.322

-4.820

Aragon
Asturias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
Castillalamancha
Castillaleon
Cataluna
Comunidadvalenciana
Extremadura
Galicia
Larioja
Madrid
Navarra
Paisvasco
Regionmurcia

-0.764

Computed from the Annuarios database. There are 3154 observations, and the log-likelihood is -3312. The pseudo rsquare is .159
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